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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case   
Lester Laural Jones appeals from the district court’s order denying his 
post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing.  
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 In June 2012, the Madison County Sheriff’s Office received information 
that 49-year-old Lester Jones recently had a sexual relationship with 17-year-old 
D.R.  (#40863 R., pp.13-16.1)  Detective Curtis Wood contacted D.R., who told 
him that she started dating Jones when she was 16, that the relationship became 
sexual, and that D.R. was the father of her six-month-old child.  (#40863 R., 
p.15.)  D.R. also disclosed that she broke off the relationship with Jones several 
months earlier.  (Id.)  Detective Wood then contacted Jones, who admitted that 
he had a sexual relationship with D.R. before she turned 18, and that D.R.’s child 
was his.  (#40863 R., pp.15-17.)    
                                                        
1 The district court took judicial notice of the records associated with Jones’ 
underlying criminal case, Madison County Case No. 2012-02108.  (R., p.116 n.1, 
pp.137-138; Tr., p.162, L.13 – p.163, L.23.)  It also appears that Jones submitted 
the clerk’s record and reporter’s transcripts associated with his direct appeal as 
Exhibit E in the post-conviction proceeding (though these documents were 
somehow omitted from the appellate record in this case).  (See R., p.9.)  The 
state attached the transcripts of Jones’ change of plea and sentencing hearings 
to its post-conviction petition Answer.  (R., pp.40-65.)  In his Appellant’s brief, 
Jones indicated an intention to file a motion requesting this Court to take judicial 
notice of the record from his direct appeal.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.1-2 n.1.)   It 
does not appear that Jones has yet filed such a motion.  Therefore, 
contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion requesting that this 
Court take judicial notice of the clerk’s record and reporter’s transcripts 
associated with Jones’ direct appeal, Docket No. 40863. 
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 The state charged Jones with statutory rape and the I.C. § 19-2520G 
repeat sex offender sentencing enhancement.2  (#40863 R., pp.26-29.)  R. 
James Archibald was appointed to represent Jones.  (#40863 R., p.20.)  
However, approximately four months later, and before entering into a plea 
agreement with the state, Jones retained Joshua A. Garner to represent him.  
(#40863 R., p.37.)  
 Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Jones pled guilty to statutory 
rape and the state agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement.  (#40863 Tr., 
p.5, L.15 – p.19, L.21.)  The state also agreed to limit its recommendation with 
respect to the fixed portion of Jones’ sentence to ten years.  (Id.)  The district 
court ordered a psychosexual evaluation, permitted Jones to choose which of 
two providers would conduct the evaluation, and notified Jones of his 
constitutional right not to participate in the evaluation.  (#40863 Tr., p.2, L.12 – 
p.3, L.4; p.14, L.16 – p.16, L.7; p.20, Ls.1-12.) 
 The district court imposed a unified 30-year sentence with 10 years fixed.  
(#40863 R., pp.44-45.)  Jones filed a notice of appeal, timely from the judgment 
of conviction.  (#40863 R., pp.48-51.)  Jones also filed a timely I.C.R. 35 motion 
for reduction of sentence.  (#40863 R., pp.46-47.)  The district court denied this 
motion.  (#40863 R., p.53.)  On direct appeal, Jones asserted that his sentence 
was excessive, but did not challenge the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 
motion. See State v. Jones, 2014 WL 280371 (Idaho App. January 24, 2014) 
                                                        
2 The state alleged that Jones was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct in 
1991.  (#40863 R., p.28.) 
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(unpublished).  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s sentence.  
Id.    
 In February 2015, through counsel, Jones filed a post-conviction petition 
accompanied by a supporting affidavit and other exhibits.  (R., pp.6-36.)  The 
petition consisted of two broad categories of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims with approximately 17 total sub-claims.  (R., pp.6-18.)  Jones alleged that 
both Archibald, Jones’ initial appointed counsel, and Garner, Jones’ retained 
counsel, were ineffective.  (R., pp.9-15.)  Relevant to this appeal, Jones alleged 
that Garner was ineffective for failing to request funds to perform a private and 
confidential psychosexual evaluation for defense review, and for failing to inform 
Jones of his right to appeal from the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion.  
(R., pp.14-15.) 
 The state filed a motion for the summary dismissal of all of Jones’ post-
conviction claims and sub-claims.  (R., pp.76-78, 110-114.)  After a hearing, the 
district court granted the state’s motion with respect to all of Jones’ ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims regarding Archibald, but denied the motion with 
respect to all of Jones’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims regarding Garner.  
(R., pp.116-122.)  The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the claims 
relating to Garner.  (Id.)   
 Archibald, Garner, Jones, and Jones’ sister testified at the evidentiary 
hearing.  (Tr., p.44, L.6 – p.159, L.5.)  After the hearing, in a memorandum 
decision, the district court denied Jones’ remaining ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  (R., pp.158-174.)  The court concluded that Jones failed to 
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establish any of his claims by a preponderance of evidence.  (R., p.171.)  Jones 
timely appealed.  (R., pp.175-179.) 
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ISSUE 
 Jones states the issue on appeal as: 
 Whether the district court erred in failing to make specific 
findings of fact, and by failing to state expressly its conclusions of 
law, relating to each issue presented by Mr. Jones at his evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
Has Jones failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying the 
two challenged post-conviction claims after an evidentiary hearing?    
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ARGUMENT 
Jones Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred In Denying The 
Two Challenged Post-Conviction Claims After An Evidentiary Hearing 
 
 
A. Introduction   
Jones contends that the district court erred in denying his post-conviction 
petition after an evidentiary hearing.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  
Specifically, Jones contends that the court violated I.C. § 19-4907(a) by failing to 
“make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law,” with 
respect to two of his ineffective assistance of counsel sub-claims: (1) that Garner, 
his retained counsel, was ineffective for failing to request funds to perform a 
private and confidential psychosexual evaluation for defense review, and (2) that 
Garner was ineffective for failing to advise Jones of his right to appeal the district 
court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.  (Id.)   
Jones’ assertions fail for two reasons.  First, Jones is precluded from 
challenging the district court’s lack of findings for the first time on appeal.  
Second, even assuming the district court erred as alleged, reversal is not 
required because a review of the record reveals an obvious answer to the 
relevant question of whether Jones is entitled to relief on either of his claims.  
 
B. Jones Is Precluded From Challenging The District Court’s Lack Of 
Findings For The First Time On Appeal 
  
Idaho Code § 19-4907(a) directs that a district court in a post-conviction 
action “shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of 
law, relating to each issue presented.”  However, I.R.C.P. 52(c) provides that “[n]o 
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party may assign as error the lack of findings unless the party raised the issue to 
the court by an appropriate motion.”  See also Bedke v. Pickett Ranch and Sheep 
Co., 143 Idaho 36, 41, 137 P.3d 423, 428 (2006) (“Because Pickett Ranch did not 
raise to the district court the alleged lack of findings regarding Bedke’s 
maintenance practices [as required by I.R.C.P. 52(c)], it cannot assign the lack of 
findings on that issue as error on appeal.”).  Further, it is well-established that 
issues which are raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by the 
appellate court.  DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 
(2009); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d 376, 384 (2004). 
In this case, Jones failed to make use of avenues by which he could have 
utilized a motion to challenge the district court’s alleged lack of findings below, 
e.g., I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) (governing motions for reconsideration); I.R.C.P. 52(b) 
(governing motions to amend judgments or to make additional findings); I.R.C.P. 
59(e) (governing motions for relief from judgment).  Therefore, Jones is 
precluded from raising this issue for the first time on appeal, and this Court 
should affirm the district court’s order denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction 
claims.  
 
C. In The Alternative, Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief Because A Review Of 
 The Record Reveals An “Obvious Answer To The Relevant Question” Of 
 Whether He Can Satisfy The Strickland Standard With Respect To Either 
 Of The Challenged Claims 
 
As noted above, I.C. § 19-4907(a) directs that a district court in a post-
conviction action “shall make specific findings of fact, and state expressly its 
conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented.” The purpose of this 
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requirement is to afford an appellate court an adequate basis upon which to 
review the district court’s decision when a petition for post-conviction relief has 
been denied following an evidentiary hearing.  Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 
405, 775 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 1989); Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 497, 
700 P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1985).  However, the absence of express findings 
and conclusions may be disregarded by the appellate court where the record is 
clear and yields an obvious answer to the relevant question.  Maxfield, 108 Idaho 
at 497, 700 P.2d at 119.  “The failure of the trial court to make specific findings 
and state its conclusions thus does not necessarily require reversal.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).   
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must 
prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.  I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart 
v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).  To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in a post-conviction petition, the 
petitioner must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the 
petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687–688 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 
(Ct. App. 1995).  To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of 
showing that the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.  Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
(1988).  To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for the attorney’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would 
have been different.  Id. at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.   
9 
 
In his post-conviction petition, among numerous other allegations, Jones 
alleged that Garner was ineffective for failing to request funds to perform a 
private and confidential psychosexual evaluation for defense review, and for 
failing to advise Jones of his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 
35 motion.  (R., pp.14-15.)  The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing on 
these and other sub-claims alleging ineffective assistance of Garner.  (R., pp.116-
122.)  The district court did not specifically reference these two sub-claims in its 
memorandum decision denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction claims following 
the evidentiary hearing.  (See R., pp.158-174.)  However, Jones is still not 
entitled to a remand in this case because the record is clear and there is an 
“obvious answer to the relevant question” of whether Jones can demonstrate he 
is entitled to relief.   
1. Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Claim That Garner Was 
Ineffective For Failing To Request Funds To Perform A Private And 
Confidential Psychosexual Evaluation For Defense Review 
 
In his post-conviction petition, Jones alleged: 
Mr. Garner did not request funds to have a confidential and 
privileged evaluation completed for review by the defense before 
deciding whether to disclose the results to the prosecutor and the 
Court.  
 
(R., p.14.) 
 
  This sub-claim was related to a broader sub-claim asserting that Garner 
was ineffective with respect to the pyschosexual evaluation.  Jones also alleged 
that Garner was ineffective for failing to adequately explain to him his 
constitutional right not to participate in the evaluation, and for ultimately choosing 
an evaluator who was disfavored by Jones.  (R., pp.13-14.)  At the post-
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conviction evidentiary hearing, Garner testified that he could not recall if he had 
ever discussed with Jones the possibility of obtaining a private, confidential 
evaluation, and Jones testified that he did not have any such discussions with 
Garner.  (Tr., p.74, Ls.21-24; p.115, Ls.12-14.)    
In its memorandum decision denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction 
claims, the district court concluded that Jones failed to meet his burden of 
establishing that he was entitled to relief on “any of his claims.”  (R., p.171.)  The 
court expressly analyzed Jones’ claims that Garner was ineffective for failing to 
adequately explain to him his constitutional rights with respect to the evaluation, 
and for choosing an evaluator whom Jones disfavored.  (R., pp.166-168.)  The 
court did not expressly discuss the related sub-claim that Garner was ineffective 
for failing to request funds for a confidential and privileged evaluation.  (See Id.)    
A review of the record and the applicable law reveals that the “obvious 
answer to the relevant question” of whether Jones is entitled to relief on this 
claim is that he is not, and therefore, no remand is necessary despite the district 
court’s apparent failure to specifically address this claim.  Specifically, in 
Gonzalez v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 173-174, 254 P.3d 69, 74-75 (Ct. App. 2011), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that defense counsel’s obligation, as recognized 
by Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), to advise the defendant 
regarding a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation “does not extend to an 
obligation to first obtain a confidential defense evaluation to inform the decision 
whether to submit to a court-ordered evaluation.”  Therefore, the Court held, 
Gonzalez failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim and was not entitled to the 
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appointment of counsel.  Id.; see also Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168-169, 
321 P.3d 709, 718-719 (2014) (“Murray has not offered any authority whatsoever, 
nor has this Court discovered any authority, suggesting that failing to inform a 
client of their ability to seek a confidential evaluation prior to pleading guilty falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”).  
Because Jones cannot demonstrate that his counsel’s failure to obtain a 
confidential evaluation constituted deficient performance pursuant to Strickland, 
Jones cannot show he is entitled to relief on this claim.  Because the record is 
clear and there is an “obvious answer to the relevant question,” this Court should 
affirm the district court’s denial of this claim. 
2. Jones Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Claim That Garner Was 
Ineffective For Failing To Advise Jones Of His Right To Appeal The 
District Court’s Denial Of His I.C.R. 35 Motion For Reduction Of 
Sentence 
 
In his post-conviction petition, Jones alleged: 
Finally, Mr. Garner did not inform Mr. Jones of his right to appeal 
the denial of [Jones’] Rule 35 motion.  Mr. Jones would have 
appealed the denial of his Rule 35 motion had he known that such 
an avenue was available to him. 
 
(R., p.15.) 
 
 At the evidentiary hearing, Jones testified that he did not know he had a 
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion until it was too late 
to file such an appeal, and that he would have appealed had he been aware of 
his right to do so.  (Tr., p.120, Ls.13-24.)  Jones’ sister testified that Jones’ family 
was unaware that an appeal was a possibility.  (Tr., p.92, Ls.19-23.)  Garner 
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testified that he did not recall whether he discussed a potential I.C.R. 35 appeal 
with Jones.  (Tr., p.77, Ls.5-17.)   
At the conclusion of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the district 
court referenced this claim and ordered the production of the transcript of the 
I.C.R. 35 hearing.  (Tr., p.160, L.15 – p.161, L.8.)  However, the court did not 
expressly analyze or reference the claim in its memorandum decision and order 
denying Jones’ remaining post-conviction claims.  (See R., pp.158-174.)   
A review of the record and the applicable law reveals that the “obvious 
answer to the relevant question” of whether Jones is entitled to relief on this 
claim is that he is not, and therefore, no remand is necessary despite the district 
court’s apparent failure to specifically address this claim.  Specifically, I.A.R. 
17(e)(1)(C) provides that a notice of appeal from a judgment shall be deemed to 
include “[a]ll interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the 
judgment or order appealed from except orders relinquishing jurisdiction after a 
period of retained jurisdiction or orders granting probation following a period of 
retained jurisdiction.”    
In this case, the district court entered the underlying judgment of 
conviction on February 12, 2013.  (#40863 R., pp.44-45.)  Jones filed his I.C.R. 
35 motion on March 7, 2013.  (#40863 R., pp.46-47.)  Jones filed a notice of 
appeal from the judgment of conviction on March 22, 2013, and an amended 
notice of appeal on April 23, 2013.  (#40863 R., pp.48-51, 55-58.)  The district 
court denied Jones’ I.C.R. 35 motion on April 1, 2013.  (#40863 R., p.53.)   
Therefore, pursuant to I.A.R. 17(e)(1)(C), Jones’ notice of appeal from his 
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judgment of conviction was deemed to include the district court’s post-conviction 
order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.  See also State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 326, 
859 P.2d 359, 362 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that, pursuant to I.A.R. 
17(e)(1)(C), the district court’s denial of Fortin’s I.C.R. 35 motion was properly 
before the Court of Appeals even though Fortin filed his notice of appeal from the 
corresponding judgment of conviction before the district court dismissed the 
I.C.R. 35 motion).  Jones could have raised issues related to the denial of his 
I.C.R. 35 motion in his direct appeal, but did not.  Therefore, Jones cannot 
demonstrate Strickland deficiency or prejudice with respect to Garner and this 
claim.     
Because Jones cannot demonstrate that Garner’s alleged failure to advise 
him of his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion 
constituted deficient performance or resulted in prejudice pursuant to Strickland, 
Jones cannot show he is entitled to relief on this claim.  Because the record is 
clear and there is an “obvious answer to the relevant question,” this Court should 
affirm the district court’s denial of this claim.        
 
D. If This Court Concludes That The District Court Erred And That Remand Is 
Necessary, Jones Is Not Entitled To A New Evidentiary Hearing 
 
Jones requests that this Court vacate the district court’s post-conviction 
denial order and remand the case for a new evidentiary hearing.  (Appellant’s 
brief, p.9.)  However, should this Court find that the district court committed 
reversible error by failing to specifically address the two challenged post-
conviction claims, it should instead vacate the denial order and remand the case 
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with instructions for the court to address each claim based upon the evidence 
already submitted in the post-conviction proceeding.  Jones is not entitled to a 
new evidentiary hearing or a second opportunity to present evidence because he 
asserts only post-hearing error with respect to these two claims.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order denying Jones’ remaining two post-conviction claims.  
 DATED this 5th day of May, 2017. 
      _/s/ Mark W. Olson________  
      MARK W. OLSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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